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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
JOHN "\V. NIELSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 7203

GLEN MAUCHLEY,
Defenda;nt and Respondent.

Appeal from the District Court of the
First Judicial District, in and for
Cache County, State of Utah.

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
Respondent agrees with statement in Appellant's
brief relating to the proceedings out of which this appeal
has arisen. Similarly, except for palpable typographical
errors, respondent agrees with appellant's summary of
the complaint and answer.
Respondent disagrees in some particulars with appellant's summary of the facts. The general facts as
to time, the locality where the accident occurred and the
icy condition of the road are not in dispute. As to what
the record shows hearing upon how the accident happened and the position of the two vehicles with respect
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to each other, the parties are not in accord, hence this
additional statement. Appellant in his brief, has designated himself as plaintiff and respondent as defendant.
Those designations, accordingly, will be continued in
this brief.

FACTS
Plaintiff admits that as he approached defendant's
dwelling house from the west on the College Ward-~1ill
ville Road, in Cache County, Utah, and when he was 300
feet west of the driveway to said house he saw defendant's bus emerge from beside the east of defendant's
house and come into view, backing out beyond the south
wall of said house toward the road (Tr. 92). Both vehicles continued on and while plaintiff traveled a di~
tance of fifty-seven feet (Tr. 93) defendant's bus traveled, without stopping, from the house to the fence, then
twenty-four feet (Tr. 94) across the roadway to the
edge of the north shoulder (Tr. 96, 97). Then it "went
right out onto the road" and "clear across it." (Tr. 97).
The transcript of the evidence shows the following
in the plaintiff's testimony (Tr. 96):

'' Q. All right, then, where was the rear end of his
bus when you were on the culvert~
A. The rear end of his bus was, I'd say, just
about out to the shoulder. The back end of
the bus.
Q. Now you say the back end of the bus \Yas
about out to the shoulder~
A. Yes.
Q. When you were on top of the culvert~
A. Yes.
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Q. X ow is that your testimony
A. :Jf y tP8timony, yes.''

Again the plaintiff testified as follows (T.r. 97) :
'' Q. But when you were on top of the culvert the
back end of his bus was about even with the
north shoulder
A. I'd say yes.
Q. There's no doubt about that, is there~
A. I don't think so.''

Neither vehicle stopped and they were at that moment about 243 feet apart. Plaintiff then was apprehensive and looked down at his speedometer ''to see just
about what speed my car was running at that point,
because I realized what was going to happen.'' (Tr. 92).
Plaintiff had been aware of the movement of defendant's bus while he traversed the fifty-seven feet,
had come up on.to the top of the culvert and had reduced
his speed from about 25 miles per hour to about 20 miles
per hour (Tr. 65).
There was six feet of shoulder and thirty-three feet
more spac~ to the fence on his right to the south beyond
the shoulder, (Tr. 88), thirty-nine feet all told, yet plaintiff continued on, covered the intervening distance, turned
north to his left across the center of the road and collided
with the bus, the left front wheel and fender of plaintiff's
automobile making contact with the left side of the bus
"Right in front of his left rear wheel" (Tr. 99). The
left rear wheel of the bus was two feet north of the
center line (Tr. 99). The bus was at approximately 45°
angle with the highway, facing northwest (Tr. 100).
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After being warned of the danger, realizing what
was going to happen, plaintiff continued on approximately 120 feet, one half the distance between the culvert
and defendant's driveway, without doing anything to
avert the impending collision. Then, he tried to stop" and it couldn't be done." ( Tr. 66).
At the close of the evidence, defendant moved for
a directed verdict charging plaintiff with negligence and
carelessness proximately resulting in the accident and
injuries complained of.
In ruling on that motion the court said :
''In considering this motion the Court must
take into consideration the testimony, which seems
too clear to be controverted, and in ruling on this
question I'm going to consider the testimony of
the plaintiff only without considering the testimony of the defendant. It is presumed that the
testimony of the plaintiff is given in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and on that presumption the Court must look at the testimony."
(Tr. 171)
Thereupon the motion was granted.

ARGUMENT
Defendant agrees with the principle advanced by
plaintiff that in determining whether the evidence justified the ruling for the directed verdict the appellate
court must take the view of the evidence most favorable
to the plaintiff. And judging from the number of cases
cited by plaintiff bearing upon that point, one might
think that the predominant sin of trial courts in the
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granting of directed verdicts is failure to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party resisting
the motion. Close study of the cited cases, however,
~hmYs that in most instances special rules were ignorecl
which accounts for the failure to view the evidence in
its most favorable light. The motion for a directed
verdict has been likened to a demurrer to the evidence
and as said by this court in reversing the trial court in
one case where a motion for directed verdict had been
denied.
"There are other conflicts between the plaintiff's testimony and that of defendant, but we
need not consider these conflicts in the evidence
in passing upon the questions now under review.
In deciding the questions whether or not a nonsuit should have been granted or a verdict directed for the defendant, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
In testing the sufficiency of the evidence with
respect to these questions the defendant stands
in the position of admitting- the truth of plaintiff's
evidence, and all reasonable inferences which the
jury might fairly draw therefrom favorable to
the plaintiff.'' Elswood vs. Oregon Short Line,
82 Utah 235, 23 P. (2nd) 925.
That comment specifically referring to conflicts between plaintiff's testimony and that of defendant, with
defendant's motion for a directed verdict to be decided,
illustrates a frequent error of trial courts, which is,
allowing themselves to be influenced by defendant's testimony. Doing S'O amounts to an invasion by the court of
the province and function of the jury. Of the cases cited
in plaintiff's brief in that class are, Roach vs. Railroad
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

Co., 69 Utah 530, 256 Pac. 1061, Ricks vs. Budge, 91 Utah
307, 64 Pac. (2nd) 208, and Lee vs. New York Life Insurance Co., 95 Utah 445, 82 Pac. (2nd) 178.
In Uhr vs. Eaton, 95 Utah 309, 80 P. (2nd) 925, also
cited by plaintiff, the trial court held the defendant
immune to damages in a slander case because she had
been consistent in her statements in the initial interview
with the prosecutor and at the preliminary hearing. The
court did not give effect to the rule that bad faith or
falsity destroys the immunity, and that evidence of
falsity in the damage c:1se ~hould be pass·ed np0n hy the
jury.
In Graham vs. Johnson, 109 Utah 346, 166 Pac.
(2nd) 230 (modified on motion for rehearing), the court
ruled out plaintiff's claim to recovery because he was
clearly negligent, failing to recognize that, ''the socalled humanitarian doctrine of last clear chance applies''
to nullify the effect of that neglect.
In Groesbeck vs. Lakeside Printing Co., 55 Utah 335,
186, Pac. 103, it was failure to give importance to the
position of plaintiff, an employee of tender years, injured
while subject to the mechanical hazards of a printing
press, that accounted for the reversal of the trial court.
Where as here, however, depending upon the testimony of the plaintiff alone for the facts, we think the
court was not obliged to sift somewhat contradictory
statements of plaintiff himself and take only those which
would make up an unreasonable account of what took
place. It is presumed, as Judge Morrison said that the
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plaintiff's own testimony states the most favorable view
of the plaintiff's case. And of the plaintiff's own testimony where there are conflicts, he could believe that
least favorable to the plaintiff.
This court, on that point, has said in a case where
plaintiff had sued for damages, alleging negligence of
defendant and had himself testified as to the conditions
constituting such negligence, in reversing the trial court
for refusing to grant a non-suit because of contributory
negligence :
"The plaintiff's knowledge of the dangerous
place at the time of the accident is shown by his
own testimony. In such a case ·where a non-suit
is asked, the trial court may consider such testimony true as bears the most strongly against the
interest of the plaintiff.'' Fowler vs. Pleasant
Valley Coal Co., 16 Utah 384, 52 P. 594.
To the same effect is Putnam vs. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 187, 14 P. (2nd) 973, where this court said
in reviewing an award of the Industrial Commission.
"In considering the testimony of the applicant
on the issue as to whose employ he was in, we
must look, not alone to the answers made by hiln
to leading questions, or an assumption that he
was in the employ of Putnam, but to the whole of
the testimony bearing on the subject. As to that,
the familiar rule is applicable that testimony of
a witness on his direct examination is no stronger
than as modified or left by his further examination or by his cross-examination. A particular
part of his testimony may not be singled out to
the exclusion of another part of equal importance
bearing on the subject.''
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Accordingly, while the view of the evidence adopted
by the trial court may not be as favorable as plaintiff,
would like it to be, yet tested by the rules of evidence
enunciated above, it is what the trial court had a right
to take as the plaintiff's case. And shielded from the
diluting effect which consideration of defendant's evidence would have had upon it, it becomes "the view
most favorable to the plaintiff'' which the appellate
court should consider in passing upon this appeal.
Another principle which this court will take notice
of in reaching its conclusion is that the judgment of the
trial court is presumed to be correct.
''Every presumption must be indulged on appeal in favor of correctness of judgment below
and hence in absence of anything in the record to
the contrary, \Ye must presume that the court was
right in directing judgment for the defendant."
Hutchinson vs. Smart, 51 Ut. 172, 169 P. 166.
Plaintiff seems to misconstrue just what the judgment is. In Appellant's Brief, page 6, this reference is
made:
"The court held that in-as-much as the plaintiff was travelling 25 miles an hour when 300 feet
from the point he was contributory negligent as
a matter of law."
The trial court actually said :
"Here this accident occurred on an early
winter morning at 7 :40 when it is admitted that
the roads were icy and slick. Mr. Nielsen has
testified that as he crossed the culvert, which is
approximately 250 feet on his testimony,-that
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he obselTed that school bus backing out; that he
was apprehensive that there might be an accident,
and he looked at his speedometer and ascertained
that he was going t\Yenty-five miles an hour. Yet
in view of that warning which he had, or that
apprehension which he had 250 feet down the
road, he continued on until the accident occurred.''
(Tr. 171).
From this it is clear that the court determined upon
two acts of. negligence by plaintiff:
1. ''Yet in view of the warning which he had,
or that apprehension which he had 250 feet down
the road, he continued until the accident occurred." (Tr. 171).

2. "The law also requires a person driving
upon the highway to have sufficient control of
his automobile that he can handle it in cases of
emergency, that he is not to drive his automobile
at a rate which is-or a speed which is excessive
in view of the time of day, the visibility on the
highway, and the weather conditions. The conditions being such as they were, a speed of twentyfive miles an hour, if that ·were the speed upon
that highway, when the testimony tends to show
that an accident 250 feet lower down the road
could not be avoided without skidding and svYerYing and striking the car, it seems to me that the
testimony that has been given is sufficiently clear
and compelling that the Court must find as a
matter of law that the plaintiff was negligent in
the operation of his automobile and that his negligence, if not the cause of, contributed to the injuries which he received." (Tr. 171, 172).
Plaintiff seems to argue also that the trial court
erred by finding that defendant was not negligent.
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Otherwise we fail to understand the applicability of the
cases cited on pages 10 and 11 of Appellant's brief.
The court said respecting defendant (Tr. 172):
'' . . . Now in this particular instance the
defendant may have been negligent, he may have
been culpably negligent, yet I feel that the testimony shows that the plaintiff was also negligent,
which negligence contributed to his injury, and
the Court in the circumstances must direct a
verdict in favor of the defendant and against the
plaintiff 'no cause of action'."
Under the circumstances of this case, it is elemental
that if plaintiff were negligent and such negligence contributed to or was the proximate cause of the accident
and injuries he cannot recover from defendant regardless of any classification of defendant with respect to
negligence. Accordingly, we shall answer plaintiff's
argument concerning right of way, wholly as it relates
to plaintiff's own negligence.
In the Minnesota case, Salters vs. Uhler, 292 N. \V.
762, cited by plaintiff at page 8 of his brief, the Supreme
Court said:
"Until a reasonable ground appeared to make
plaintiff appreciate that defendant was going to
enter the highway irrespective of plaintiff's presnee, he had a right to assume that due care would
be exercised. ''
And then concluded apparently that there was no such
reasonable ground shown in the evidence, as the trial
court was reversed for granting defendant's motion for
a directed verdict.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13

In contrast to that, the facts in our case, as hereinbefore set out, show that when this plaintiff was on top
of the culvert 243 feet away, he knew that an accident
would happen. Defendant was then driving onto the
north shoulder and continued onto the hard surface. In
face of all of that, plaintiff kept on from the culvert to
half way to defendant's driveway, (about 120 feet)
before he did anything about it, before he tried to stop
''and then it couldn't be done.'' Even under the requirement of the Salters case, this plaintiff knew when he was
243 feet away, that defendant was entering onto the
shoulder of the road, that he had only six feet of shoulder,
and then the hard surface, and that he did not stop.
There was no need for a ''jury to decide whether plaintiff apprehended the risk seasonably," as there was in
the Salters case. He ''knew ·what '\Yas goint; to ha.pJ1en, '~
and admits traveling about 120 feet before doing anything to prevent it. There is no conflict between plaintiff and defendant in that evidence to require the functioning of a jury. .And as reasonable minds would all
agree that failure to act while traveling even twenty
feet or fifty feet, coming closer all the time to tragedy,
would be unwise, all would certainly agree that to continue on for 120 feet at 20 miles per hour would be foolhardy and careless beyond excuse. Certainly then, on
the two grounds, it was negligence as a matter of law.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in allowing plaintiff
Salter such a favorable position with respect to the right
of way statute, supports what has been called the '' absolute" right of way rule. That rule, however, does not
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represent the weight of authority and clearly is not the
law of this state.
An annotation in 136 A.L.R. 1497, 1498, shows the
distinction between conferring an ''absolute'' right of
way upon the favored vehicles and the "relative" view.
In that annotation it is said:
''As pointed out in the earlier annotation (89
A.L.R. 838) by the weight of authority a 'relative'
construction is given to statutes confirming rights
of way. As illustrative of the decisions adhering
to the 'relative' construction, reference may be
made to the following cases decided since the
prior annotation, in which it was expressly held
that in the application of statutes or ordinances
giving vehicles approaching from the right, the
right of way, priority of time in approaching an
intersection and distance are important factors
and that the statutes do not give an 'absolute'
privilege to the vehicle approaching from the
right.''
This court has had occasion recently to review the
obligations of drivers who dispute the meaning of right
of way and to declare that such right is not ''absolute''
but "relative." Listed with the cases in 136 A.L.R. 1497.
1498~ supra, is a Utah case prominent a f~e:w years ago
and referred to with approval by the recent decisions of
this court which have considered the right of way rule,
Bullock vs. Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 Pacific (2nd) 350.
There this court reversed the trial court fo1· failure to
grant defendant's motion for a directed verdict and said:
"He who has the right of way may assume
that the driver on the left will afford him that
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right. . .. But his rights are only relative ..
The circumstances may be such, that by his own
conduct, he who ha8 the apparent right of way
has lost the benefit of that right; or the circumstances may be surh that for him to insist that
this position on the right entitled him to proceed
first through the intersection would be carelessness and negligence upon his part. The possessor
of the right of way is not relieved of the necessity
of exercising care simply because he is the driver
on the right."
u

Justice \Volfe in his concurring opinion explained
why this court adopted the ''relative'' rather than the
''absolute'' view in these words, ''This ruling encourages both the drivers to be careful."
In the case of Hickok vs. Skinner, ____ Utah ______ , 190
Pacific (2nd) 514 in affirming the rule of the Bullock
case this court said :
''Regardless of which driver is technically entitled to the right of way, both operators must
use due care and caution in proceeding into and
across intersections. While the burden to drive
so carefully as always to be prepared for, and to
be able to avoid, the negligence of another should
not be placed on either driver, there should be
placed on both the burden to keep a proper lookout and to use reasonable care to avoid a collision. Neither should be permitted to close his
eyes to other vehicles which he knows or has
reason to believe are approaching, simply because
a state statute or municipal ordinance designates
him the preferred driver. The rights of drivers
approaching and crossing intersections are relative. Both drivers have the duties of being heedful and of maintaining a proper lookout.''
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In Conklin vs. Walsh, .... Utah...... , 193 Pacific (2nd)
437, this additional comment with respect to right of way
is made in affirming the action of the trial court which
directed a verdict for plaintiff on the ground that defendant was negligent as a matter of law:
''The duty to keep a proper lookout applies
as well to the favored as to the disfavored driver.
Neither driver can excuse his failure to observe
because the other driver failed in his duty. Neither
driver is at any time to be excused for want of
vigilance or failure to see what is plain to be
seen.''
Summarizing the facts, this court had said:
"Defendant's truck driver, knowing there was
a car approaching from the north, never looked
again in that direction until it was too late to
avoid a collision.''
It might well say now:
''The favored driver, knowing that the bus
was at the edge of the north shoulder, and was
continuing on across its width of six feet onto
the pavement, did nothing about it ,,~hile he traveled about 120 feet until it was too late to avoid
a collision.''
The rule set out above would then be applicable to
our case, as we think it is applicable, and so justify the
action of the trial court in directing the verdict for defendant.
It is recognized that our case, strictly speaking is
not an intersection case except as the highway on which
the plaintiff, Nielsen, was driving intersected with de-

l
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fendant 's drive'lvay. As plaintiff admits in his brief,
Section 57-7-139 U. C. A. 1943, has not been construed by
this court. This section had been considered by the Supreme Court of the state of California in the year 1930,
prior to the time it became the law' of this state, in a
case also cited by plaintiff. The California statute read:
"The driver of a vehicle entering a public
highway from a private road or drive shall yield
the right of way to all vehicles approaching on
said highway."
This, except for a few immaterial variations, is identical with the Utah statute. The California court had
this to say regarding it:
''The argument is made that, irrespective of
the distance between the approaching car driven
by the defendant, Mary Horn, and the private
highway on which the truck was emerging, it gave
the defendant the right of way. The subdivision
of the section, however, is not susceptible of any
such interpretation. If interpreted litera1ly as
the subdivision reads, or as it then read, no one
could ever drive from a private road upon a public
highway if any one were approaching upon such
highway irrespective of the d]st:;~nce. The subdivision must be construed .to give effect to the
intent of the legislature which was to prevent
automobile drivP.rs on private roads from entering a public highway when a car was approaching
upon such highway so near as to constitute an
immediate hazard, and not that no one should
enter upon a public highway from a private road
or driveway so long as the public highway was
in use." Wakefield vs. Horn (Cal.) 293 Pac. 97.
It is assumed that plaintiff quoted the said section
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and cited the Salters case to justify the view that plaintiff had an absolute right of way. It is submitted that
the decision of the California court, interpreting the
private driveway statute, and the decisions of this court
relative to right of way in intersection cases adequately
refutes that contention and justified the trial court in
this case in granting defendant's motion for a directed
verdict.
We dispute not plaintiff's statement that contributory negligence as a matter of law, can properly be
found by the court only where reasonable minds would
agree that the party charged with negligence acted in
an imprudent manner so as to contribute to the accident
and injuries; nor do we dispute that cases where a court
will so declare are rare; nor that where· the evidence or
plaintiff and defendant are in conflict it is the province
of the jury to find the facts.
We do contend, however, that neither of those rules
were violated by the judgment of the trial court in this
case, that on the contrary the neglect of plaintiff, judged
from his own testimony alone, was so patent, that as in
the Bullock vs. Luke case, supra, this court could have
properly reversed the trial court had it failed to grant
defendant's motion.
Defendant accordingly prays that the judgment be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
MERRILL C. FAUX
Attorney for Respondent.

.
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